Research Notes
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Research Notes
Marketing set to ramp up in the second half
The elephant in the room
Post balance pick up
2H24: Minimal surprises
Picks up a bargain?
Cruising past the industry margin pressures
Industrial Access was the star performer
Cash machine
A nice 2Q25 turn around
Back on the throttle
News & Insights
On 7 July the AFR published a list of 37 Economists who had answered a poll on when the RBA would next cut rates. 32 of them thought that the RBA would cut on 8 July. Only 5 of them did not believe the RBA would cut on 8 July. I was one of them. The RBA did not cut.
So today I will talk about how I came to that decision. First, lets look at our model of official interest rates. Back in January 2015 I went to a presentation in San Franciso by Stan Fishcer . Stan was a celebrated economist who at that time was Ben Bernanke's deputy at the Federal Reserve. Stan gave a talk about how the Fed thought about interest rates.
Stan presented a model of R*. This is the real short rate of the Fed Funds Rate at which monetary policy is at equilibrium. Unemployment was shown as a most important variable. So was inflationary expectations.
This then logically lead to a model where the nominal level of the Fed funds rate was driven by Inflation, Inflationary expectations and unemployment. Unemployment was important because of its effect on future inflation. The lower the level of unemployment the higher the level of future inflation and the higher the level of the Fed funds rate. I tried the model and it worked. It worked not just for the Fed funds rate. It also worked in Australia for Australian cash rate.
Recently though I have found that while the model has continued to work to work for the Fed funds rate It has been not quite as good in modelling that Australian Cash Rate. I found the answer to this in a model of Australian inflation published by the RBA. The model showed Australian Inflation was not just caused by low unemployment, It was also caused by high import price rises. Import price inflation was more important in Australia because imports were a higher level of Australian GDP than was the case in the US.
This was important in Australia than in the US because Australian import price inflation was close to zero for the 2 years up to the end of 2024. Import prices rose sharply in the first quarter of 2025. What would happen in the second quarter of 2025 and how would it effect inflation I could not tell. The only thing I could do is wait for the Q2 inflation numbers to come out for Australia.
I thought that for this reason and other reasons the RBA would also wait for the Q2 inflation numbers to come out. There were other reasons as well. The Quarterly CPI was a more reliable measure of the CPI and was a better measure of services inflation than the monthly CPI. The result was that RBA did not move and voiced a preference for quarterly measure of inflation over monthly version.
Lets look again at R* or the real level of the Cash rate for Australia .When we look at the average real Cash rate since January 2000 we find an average number of 0.85%. At an inflation target of 2.5 % this suggests this suggest an equilibrium Cash rate of 3.35%
What will happen next? We think that the after the RBA meeting of 11 and 12 August the RBA will cut the Cash rate to 3.6%
We think that after the RBA meeting of 8 and 9 December the RBA will cut the Cash rate to 3.35%
Unless Quarterly inflation falls below 2.5% , the Cash rate will remain at 3.35% .
Investment Watch is a quarterly publication produced by Morgans that delves into key insights for equity and economic strategy.
This publication covers
Economics - 'The challenge of Australian productivity' and 'Iran, from the Suez blockade to the 12 day war'
Asset Allocation - 'Prioritise portfolio resilience amidst the prevailing uncertainty'
Equity Strategy - 'Rethinking sector preferences and portfolio balance'
Fixed Interest - 'Market volatility analysis: Low beta investment opportunities'
Banks - 'Outperformance driving the broader market index'
Industrials - 'New opportunities will arise'
Resources and Energy - 'Getting paid to wait in the majors'
Technology - 'Buy the dips'
Consumer discretionary - 'Support remains in place'
Telco - 'A cautious eye on competitive intensity'
Travel - 'Demand trends still solid'
Property - 'An improving Cycle'
Recent months have been marked by sharp swings in market sentiment, driven by shifting global trade dynamics, geopolitical tensions, and policy uncertainty. The rapid pace of US policy announcements, coupled with reversals, has made it difficult for investors to form strong convictions or accurately assess the impact on growth and earnings. While trade tariffs are still a concern, recent progress in US bilateral negotiations and signs of greater policy stability have reduced immediate headline risks.
We expect that more stable policies, potential tax cuts, and continued innovation - particularly in AI - will support a gradual pickup in investment activity. In this environment, we recommend prioritising portfolio resilience. This means maintaining diversification, focusing on quality, and being prepared to adjust exposures as new risks or opportunities emerge. This quarter, we update our outlook for interest rates and also explore the implications of the conflict in the Middle East on portfolios. As usual, we provide an outlook for the key sectors of the Australian market and where we see the best tactical opportunities.
Morgans clients receive exclusive insights such as access to our latest Investment Watch publication. Contact us today to begin your journey with Morgans.
At the beginning of the week, I was asked to write something about Iran. When I started looking at what had been happening , I realised that what we were talking about begins with an action by a proxy of Iran back in November 2023. How that was initially handled with the Biden regime, and how then it was dealt with deftly by Trump this year, in turn led to the need for an attack on Iran's nuclear facility.
Winston Churchill noted in his first volume of his history of the Second World War that it was important to understand that the United States is primarily a naval power. Indeed, the US remains the world dominant naval power. As such, two major strategic concerns remain for the US : the control of the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal .
To the US The idea that another country might block access to either of these must be intolerable. Yet what began happening, beginning on the 19th November 2023, was that , Houthi rebels that controlled a the northern part of a small country in southwestern Arabia, began to act. These Houthi rebels were acting as a proxy for Iran. They were funded by Iran, and armed with Ship-killing rockets, by Iran.
By February 2024, they had attacked 40 ships which had been attempting to sail northwards towards the Suez Canal. By March 2024, 200 ships had been diverted away from the Suez Canal and forced to make the longer and more expensive voyage around the Cape of Good Hope of South Africa. At this point, I think The Economist magazine said that this was the most severe Suez crisis since the 1950s.
The U.S. did respond. On the 18th December 2023, the U.S. had announced an international maritime force to break the Houthi blockade. On the 10th January, the UN National Security Council adopted a resolution demanding a cessation of Houthi attacks on merchant vessels.
As of the 2nd January 2024, the Houthis had already recorded 931 American and British airstrikes against sites in Yemen. Then Trump came to power. To Trump, the idea of the proxy of Iran blockading the Suez Canal could not be tolerated.
From the 15th March 2025, Trump began "Operatation Rough Rider". This was named for the cavalry commanded by the then-future President Theodore Roosevelt, who charged up San Juan Hill in Cuba during the Spanish-American War of 1898. The U.S. then hit the Houthis with over a thousand airstrikes. So they were bombing at ten times the rate they previously had been. The result of that was that by the 6th March 2025, Trump announced that the Houthis, these proxies of Iran, had capitulated as part of a ceasefire brokered by Oman. This directly led to the main game.
It was obvious that the decision to do the unthinkable, and block the Suez Canal, had come from Iran.
What other unthinkable things was Iran considering?
It is obvious that Trump now believed that the next unthinkable thing that Iran was considering was nuclear weapons. As Iran's other proxies collapsed, Iran's air defence collapsed. In turn, this gave Trump the room to act, and he took it. He launched a bombing raid which severely disabled Iran's nuclear capacity. Some say it completely destroyed it.
Iran retaliated by launching 14 rockets at the American base in Qatar, warning the Americans this was going to happen, and this had no other effect than allowing Iran to announce a glorious victory by themselves over the Americans. Iran had thought the unthinkable and had achieved what was, to them, as a result, an unthinkable reverse.
The ceasefire that has followed has been interpreted by markets as a relief from major risk. Now, the major effect of this on markets has been a dramatic rocketing in the oil price, followed by a fall in the oil price. So I thought I’d look at the fundamentals of the oil price, from running two of my models of the Brent price, using current fundamentals.
Now, the simplest model that I’ve got explains 63% of monthly variation of the Brent oil price. And it’s based on two things. One is the level of stocks in the U.S., which are published every week by the Energy Information Administration . Those stocks are down a bit in the most recent months because this is the summer driving season where oil stocks are being drawn down to provide higher demand for gasoline. So that’s a positive thing. And the other thing that I’ve been talking about this year is that I think we’re going to see a steady fall in the U.S. dollar, and that’s going to generate the beginning of a recovery in commodities prices. So if I also put the U.S. dollar index into this model, it gives me an equilibrium model now of $78.96. And that’s about $US12 higher than the oil price was this morning.
If I strengthen that model by adding the U.S. CPI, because, you know, the cost of production cost of oil raises over time, that increases the power of the model . And that lifts the equilibrium price very considerably to $97 a barrel, which is $30 a barrel higher than it currently is. So I regard that as my medium-term model, and the first one is my short-term model.
What’s really interesting is that the U.S. dollar has continued to fall. That puts further upward pressure on the oil price. So in spite of this crisis having been solved, I think we’re going to see more upward price action on the oil price by the end of the year.
